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A Research Note on Strategy in Coalition Gaining*
The debate between William Riker, Robert Butterworth, 
and others on the validity of the size principle in coalition 
gaming has uncovered some interesting arguments. However, 
none of the authors have considered the importance of long­
term strategy in the side payment bargaining process. The 
purpose of this paper is to bring coalition gaming closer to 
real-world situations by introducing two strategies which 
result in winning coalitions of greater than and smaller than 
minimum size. In the process two conclusions are reached: 
1) Butterworth's argument that the size of the winning coali­
tion is indeterminate when side payments are permitted is 
correct; 2) Riker's revised definition of a winning coali­
tion, the set of positive gainers, is not sustained in that 
a coalition of one can result from a possible maximization 
strategy in contradiction to the rule which states that a 
coalition of one will have a payoff less than zero.
Before analyzing long-term strategy the groundwork of 
the game must be established. We are dealing here with the 
five-person game devised by Riker.In it the players in 
the winning coalition are paid five points each by the
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members of the losing coalition. Table 1 depicts the payoff 
schedule in this zero-sum game.
Table 1 Payoffs in a Five-Person Game






A B C D E
0 0 0 0 0
5 5 5 5 -20
10 10 10 -15 -15
As the object of the game is to maximize gain, the coali­
tion will continue to evict members as long as it is profitable. 
In a game without side payments the minimum size of the winning 
coalition will be three and the payoff schedule for that out­
come is found in line 3 of Table 1. However, real-world coali­
tions are seldom as egalitarian as the one depicted here. Pay­
offs to the members of the winning coalition are rarely equated. 
Thus, in order to bring more realism into coalition gaming, side 
payments must be introduced into the model.
The effect of side payments on coalition theory was bril-
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liantly argued by Butterworth. He argued that the size of the 
winning coalition is indeterminate when bribes are allowed. 
Table 2 is an example of what can occur.
Table 2 A Rational Bribe
Payoffs to Players:
Situation A B C D E
1) 4 Member Coalition (ABCD) 5 5 5 5 -20
2) A ,B,C, Oust D 10 10 10 -15 -15
3) D Bribes to Stay In 
a) Bribe 6 6 6 -18 0
b) Result 11 11 11 -13 -20
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In an effort to maximize their gain the members of the 
winning coalition in this example decide to oust player D. 
The resulting payoff schedule is represented in line 2 of 
Table 2. However, player D has the option of bribing players 
A,B, and C by offering them six points each in order to remain 
a member of the winning coalition. By doing so he reduces his 
net loss from twenty to eighteen points. Players A,B, and C 
would obviously accept the bribe because it increases their 
winnings more than an eviction of player D would. The result 
of the bribe is the four person winning coalition with the 
payoff depicted in line 3b of Table 2.
In a rebuttal to this critique of his theory, Riker
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amended his definition of a winning coalition. The set of 
positive gainers now constituted such a group. In the example 
presented in Table 2, a winning coalition of minimum size 
would again exist, comprised of players A,B, and C. However, 
by examining two hypothetical yet rational strategies which 
can be used by individual players in this game we can conclude 
that Butterworth is correct when he argues that coalition size 
is indeterminate.
STRATEGY AS THE ANSWER TO THE LONE LOSER'S PROBLEM
The predicament of the lone loser in coalition gaming 
presents an interesting problem. The first player to be ousted 
is at a serious disadvantage because he does not have the alter­
native of bribing the others in order to remain a member of 
their group. To do so would require him to pay the other four 
-4-
players six points, for a total of twenty-four. It is ratio­
nal for him to admit defeat in order to reduce his losses to 
twenty points. It is possible, however, for E to get back into 
the winning coalition in a short period of time by using side 
payments and developing a minimization of loss strategy.
Analysis of E's position begins at the point where a four
man winning coalition has been established. At this point
players A,B, and C decide to oust D. Table 3 depicts the policy
options available to D in lines 2,3, and 4. Briefly stated, D
can accept defeat, bribe A,B, and C for continued membership
in the coalition, or accept a bribe from E to join him. In
Minimization of Loss Strategy
Payoffs to Players:
Table 3
Situation A B C D E
1) Four Man Coalition 5 5 5 5 -20
2) ABC Force D Out, D Does Nothing
Spoils of Victory 5 5 5 -20 5
Result 10 10 10 -15 -15
3) ABC Force D Out, D Bribes ABC
Bribe by D 6 6 6 -18 0
Result 11 11 11 -13 -20
4) ABC Force D Out, E Bribes D
Spoils of Victory 5 5 5 -20 5
Bribe by E to D 0 0 0 3 -3
Result 10. 10 10 -12 -18
5) E Offers Conditional Bribe
Bribe by E to ABC 1 1 1 0 -3
Result 11 11 11 -12 -21
6) ABC Force C Out, C Bribes
Bribe by C 6 6 -18 0 6
Result 17 17 -7 -12 -15
order to minimize his losses D will naturally choose the last
option. Player E offers the bribe because D would otherwise 
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have made an offer to A,B, and C, which would have left E's 
payoff at a dismal -20. The payoff which results from the 
bribe by E to D (10, 10, 10, -12, -18) is beneficial to both 
members of the losing coalition.
Player E's next move is to approach two members of the 
winning coalition, say A and B, and offer the coalition a 
bribe under two conditions: 1) that they allow him to enter 
the winning coalition; 2) on the next move the coalition, now 
composed of players A,B,C, and E, oust C. These two moves 
are shown in lines 5 and 6 of Table 3. In line 5, E's position 
suffers to the extent that he is worse off than when he started. 
However, due to the second condition stipulated in his bribe to 
A and B, it quickly improves to the point where it is better 
than at any other stage of the game. This highlights the im­
portance of strategy in coalition gaming. In line 6 I assume 
that C bribes his way back into the winning coalition. If he 
were to accept a bribe from D it would decrease the payoff to 
A,B, and E by one point. This, however, would have no bearing 
on my conclusion because the position of E would still be better 
than it was previously.
We are able to solve the problem of the lone loser only by 
formulating a long-term strategy. To re-enter the winning coali­
tion E first has to draw one man out, enter the coalition by 
bribery, and then force a second player to either bribe or leave 
the coalition. The last step is necessary in order to make the 
strategy a rational alternative. Analysis of strategy enables 
us to better understand the process of minimization of losses.
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It is also possible to hypothesize a strategy of maximization 
of gain.
A MAXIMIZATION OF GAIN STRATEGY
It is possible for one member of a winning coalition to 
become the sole positive gainer by implementing a strategy of 
playing the remaining members off against each other. A graphic 




Situation A B C D E
1) Four Man Coalition 5 5 5 5 -20
2) ABC Force D to Bribe
Bribe by D 6 6 6 -18 0
Result 11 11 11 -13 -20
3) ABD Force C to Bribe
Bribe by C 6 6 -18 6 0
Result 17 17 -7 -7 -20
4) ACD Force B to Bribe
Bribe by B 6 -18 6 6 0
Result 23 -1 -1 -1 -20
Let us assume that player A devises this strategy when he 
is a member of a four man winning coalition. His first move 
is to join with players B and C to force D out. In analyzing 
his position D realizes that he would lose eighteen points if 
he bribed the coalition as opposed to the twenty points he would 
otherwise be forced to forfeit. If A can convince D that the 
latter's losses will be further minimized in subsequent moves 
of the game (by informing him that this tactic will be used 
against B and C), D will be influenced to offer the bribe and 
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reject any offers from E. It is rational, therefore, for D 
to offer A,B, and C six points to remain a member of the 
winning coalition.
Player A's next moves follow the same pattern. He unites 
with B and D to force a bribe from C and then turns the tables 
on B. In each case a bribe is the rational alternative for 
the endangered player.
The result of this Strategy is a four man winning coali­
tion (A,B,C,D) with payoffs (23, -1, -1, -1, -20). Player A 
has attained a commanding position and becomes the sole positive
4 gainer.
CONCLUSIONS
Coalition behavior as modeled by Riker is rarely witnessed 
in real-world politics. Instead, one is more likely to see indi­
vidual members attempt to maximize their personal gain or minimize 
their losses. In order to accomplish these tasks the players 
would be wise to devise long-term strategies such as the ones I 
have presented here.
As a result of the introduction of strategy into the coali­
tion gaming process the conclusion is reached that the size of 
the winning coalition is indeterminate, a conclusion originally 
reached by Butterworth. In the examples presented above the 
size of the winning coalition is either three or four, the de­
ciding factor being the course of action which the player to be 
evicted pursues. It is important to note that in neither exam­
ple presented above is a stable situation reached. Coalition 
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behavior is a dynamic process and the size of the winning 
coalition will expand and contract as each player attempts 
to improve his position.
More important, perhaps, is the existence of just one 
positive gainer in the final payoff schedule of the maxi­
mization of gain strategy. This refutes Riker's revised 
definition of a winning coalition, the set of positive 
gainers, which was offered in reply t’o Butterworth's critique. 
If we were to accept this definition then player A would 
represent the winning coalition, thus giving us a coalition 
of one. However, this is incorrect because a coalition of 
one, also according to Riker, must have a payoff less than 
zero. In other words, if we accept this definition the 
result is a coalition of smaller than minimum size. If we 
reject this definition on the grounds of the above stated 
rule on payoffs to coalitions of one, the result is a coali­
tion of larger than minimum size. This coalition is made up 
of players A,B,C, and D with the payoff schedule (23, -1, -1, 
-1, -20). As a consequence of this paradox the validity of 
the size principle remains in doubt.
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